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That *L.C.M.*'s lion has also suffered diminution this month is another and hopefully the last manifestation of the 'technical reasons' to which reference was made in March (*LCM* 8.3[Mar.1983], 33), and is in no way (also hopefully) ominous. Not but what the Editor has come to realize that 16pp., quite apart from being one of the traditional sizes of the book trade and fitting neatly into the first stage of postal charges (which went up last month, except for the first stage of 2nd class, as subscribers abroad may not have noticed), is also about as much typing as the Editor can manage in a normal month (is any month normal) on top of his many and various other duties. It is presumably generally known that one of these is the actual typing of each number (as witness, say captious critics, the number of misprints, though the Editor himself thinks this is by no means high - but of course each author is always convinced that misprints are introduced into his article deliberately and of malice aforethought), a chore which has its compensations, for it enables him to form a much better idea of each article than can be gained simply by reading it, even if his fingers sometimes itch to tighten up both style and argument, and the itch, he must admit, is sometimes scratched. It seems then, though no final decision has been made, that the backlog will be dealt with not by a general increase in the size of numbers (and subscription - though that might have to go up for other reasons, the accounts for 1982 not yet having been done the Editor cannot as yet say, though he doubts it) but by the issue of a special double number in October (after the long vacation, no longer as long nor as much of a vacation as it used to seem to him in his undergraduate days). While he is on matters of 'housekeeping', let him make another bleat against footnotes (appropriately on the conclusion of that monster article which ran to 108, not all of them due to the author), and also apologize for inefficiencies in correspondence and accounting which he knows have crept in this year (the invoices have not yet been sent out, for example), and which he hopes to rectify in that longed-for long vacation.

Subscriptions have gone up by 3 to, presumably 379, an interesting footnote to the sociology of conferences (*LCM* 8.3[Mar.1983], 33) since in each case the subscriber came up to the Editor with the intimation that he had for long thought of subscribing. If *LCM* were the sort of business which could afford to pay the Editor expenses, attendance at Conferences might then be a chargeable expense. In fact what has emerged from his attendance at so many (nor are they yet over, he is off in May to the *Colloque internationale du C.N.R.S 'La B  tie antique'* at Lyons and warns subscribers that June may therefore be late and consequently perhaps July also - but let them wait till October!) is that these reflect the increasing professionalization and specialization of our discipline (at least in this country), which has really, though not everybody either recognizes this or is prepared to admit it, ceased to be the common shared basis of 'humane' education in every country. Successful conferences are therefore thematic, and such bodies as the Classical Association, which was founded to unite all 'lovers of the Classics' in defence of a discipline even then felt to be under attack, and even CUCD (which is somewhat like a pan-Hellenic congress trying to unite against Persia or Macedon or the Department of Education and Science and the University Grants Committee), lose out in consequence, the former having lost even the school teachers to the more professional JACT. In this connexion the administrative tendency noted last month (*LCM* 8.4 Apr.1983], 49) to favour Classics over separate Departments or Chairs is ironic, and hardly to be attributed to any desire to restore *Literae humaniores* to their previous position. Housman abandoned Greek on the grounds that he could be master of only one language. He may have been wrong about himself but the principle was right and we should follow it.

'Fightin' words'? Is the Editor finally abandoning ambiguity as his preferred mode of expression? R.G.Collingwood, in another context, described himself as an academic goose (like those that saved the Capitol). Your Editor, unlike him, is not, alas, fed (stuffed?) at a High Table, BUT 'cackling is my business, and cackle I will'.

- 66 LINDSAY WATSON(Sydney): *Two nautical points*: 1. Horace, Epode 1.1-2; 2. Catullus 4.20-21
LCM 8.5(May 1983), 66-69

1. Horace, Epode 1.1-2
*ibis Liburnis inter alta navium,
amice, propugnacula,
paratus omne Caesaris periculum
subire, Maecenas, tuo.*

In an article entitled 'The Date of Horace's First Epode', and published in *CQ* 20(1970), 328-334, M.W.Thompson has recently revived the old suggestion by T.Dyer ('On the Chronology of the Horatian Poems', *Classical Museum* 2[1845], 199ff.) that Epode 1 refers not, as is usually supposed, to Actium, but to Octavian's war against Sex.Pompeius in 36 B.C.. To the best of my knowledge this reinterpretation has not been seriously challenged (for some general remarks see G.Williams, *Horace* [Oxford 1972], 11). And it should be: for the arguments which Thompson advances in favour of it offend both sense and syntax, and are at odds with the portrait of Maecenas which Horace builds up in vv.1-4.

Thompson's reasoning, which is somewhat complex, may be summarized as follows. Maecenas, in lines 1ff. is on the point of departing with Octavian for a sea battle. The evidence that he accompanied him to Actium is far from conclusive (Thompson 328-9: the historical data are reviewed by E.K.Wistrand; *Horace's Ninth Epode* [Göteborg 1958], 5-19, taking as starting point the discussion by E.Fraenkel, *Horace* [Oxford 1957], 71ff.). We should therefore consider the possibility that the Epode refers to 36 B.C., the final stages of the naval campaign against Sex.Pompeius, when, it can be shown, Maecenas was definitely at Octavian's side (thus Appian, *BC* 5.99 & 112).

The most significant part of Thompson's approach is his reading of the first two lines, for it is from a variant interpretation of *ibis Liburnis inter alta navium* | ... *propugnacula* that he develops a revised chronology for this poem. According to him (p.332) *ibis inter* does not suggest an attack; rather it refers to '<Maecenas> cruising in a Liburnian among the high ships of Octavian's [my underlining] fleet'. For this explanation of the phrase, which is not generally tied, as it is by Thompson, to chronological reinterpretations, see Ps.Acro ad.loc., C.Barthius, *Adversariorum ... Libri* (Frankfurt 1648), LVII, 14, Dyer, op.cit. 206, and C.G.Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy*² (Cambridge 1960), 8: cf. also Dillenberger, in an *excursus* on Liburnians appended to his commentary (7th edition (Bonn 1881), ad loc.. 'After all', Thompson continues, 'Octavian himself is known to have adopted this course in 36 and 31' (sc. reviewing lines prior to a battle, or as peripatetic commander during the fighting): see Appian, *BC* 5.111, Octavian before the battle with Sex.Pompeius, *λιβυρνίδος δὲ αὐτὸς ἐπέβαινε καὶ περιέπλει πάντας παραναλῶν*, Plutarch, *Ant.* 65, 4, also Velleius, 2.85.2.

This interpretation of *ibis inter* allows Thompson to discard the conventional view of 1-2, which sees in them a contrast between the lighter vessels of Octavian and the larger polyremes of his opponent at Actium, Antony, and in consequence dates the poem to 31 B.C.. Now the ships which Octavian used against Sex.Pompeius were exceptionally large and equipped with towers (*propugnacula*: for the terminology see Pliny, *NH* 32.1 & 3), standing high above his opponent's vessels (Dio 49.1.2 & 3.2; Appian, *BC* 5.106), and these were used again at Actium, as is clear from Dio 50.19.3. Hence the description *alta navium* ... *propugnacula*, referring in Thompson's opinion, we saw, to Octavian's ships, could, in theory, describe his battle fleet either in 36 or 31. But, says Thompson, if the reference is to 31, *alta* is weak; its only function would be to contrast Octavian's tall vessels with his lighter Liburnians. If, on the other hand, the reference is to 36, *alta* has some point: it reminds us that the big ships of Octavian tower over, not only his own Liburnians, but over the ships of his enemy Sex.Pompeius as well (whose vessels, appropriately to one who was traditionally presented as a pirate-leader, were light, swift and low in the water; cf. Dio 49.3.6, and Appian, *BC* 5.106 *ἦν δὲ καὶ τὰ σκάφη Πομπηίῳ μὲν βραχύτερα* [sc. than Octavian's] *καὶ κοῦρα καὶ ὀρεά ἐς τὰς ἐφορήσεις*).

Whatever may be thought on this interpretation of *alta* as an argument for preferring the date 36 over 31 B.C., Thompson has done valuable service by raising questions about the meaning of *ibis inter*, and showing that, from an historical point of view, the details given in vv.1-4 of the Epode do not argue unequivocally for 31 B.C. - so that dating the poem will depend *inter alia* upon interpretation of these details.

Thompson's understanding of *ibis Liburnis inter alta navium* | ... *propugnacula* calls for comment. Firstly, 'cruising among the tall ships of Octavian's fleet' is a remarkably oblique way to picture Maecenas' participation in the coming battle (with no mention of an enemy, even!), given that the next couplet loudly proclaims his courage, *paratus omne Caesaris periculum* | *subire* ... *tuo*, given too the veiled hint in *si contra* (6) that the expedition may cost Maecenas his life. And, after all, a primary concern of the poet in the opening lines is to establish Maecenas' bravery and loyalty to his general (by contrast with Horace, who (vv.7-22) is loyal, in turn, to Maecenas, but not brave). In other words, in view of what follows, we expect Horace, in 1-2, to depict Maecenas boldly facing danger, not hemmed in by his own side's fleet (whereas, according to Thompson [332], Horace was too honest to depict Maecenas as playing a prominent part in the actual battle). Such danger can only be represented by *alta navium* ... *propugnacula*.

It is worth looking afresh at the sense of *ibis* ... *inter*. *inter* is regularly used in conjunction with words for arms or hostile forces: e.g. Virgil, *Ecl.* 10.44-45 *nunc insanus amor duri me Martis in armis* | *tela inter media atque aduersos detinet hostes*; Livy 2.46.4 *Q.Fabium* ... *Tuscos incautum inter multas uersantem hostium manus, gladio per pectus transfigit* (cf. Cicero, *Phil.* 14.36; *Top.* 1.5), 10.35.15 *uel solum, si nemo alius sequatur, iturum aduersus hostes casurumque inter signa Samnitium*. In view of the context, a sea battle, and the desirability of Horace's having mentioned some form of enemy activity in the opening couplet, there is a strong possibility, ignored by Thompson, that *inter* is so used here with *alta navium* ... *propugnacula*: these will therefore represent the hostile force regularly prefaced by *inter*.

But we can establish the meaning of *ibis ... inter* more precisely. *inter* is not infrequently met, in combination with verbs of motion or their equivalent, signifying 'movement into': see *TLL* VII, 1, 2129, 6ff.. We have one example where *inter* is so used in conjunction with *ire*, Ovid, *Met.* 8.376-7 *uulnera fecissent, nisi saetiger inter opacas | nec iaculis isset nec equo loca peruia siluas* (cf. Virgil, *Ecl.* 2.3-4 *inter densas umbrosa cacumina fagos | adsidue ueniebat.*). Now examples of *inter* with the verb *ire* are exceedingly rare (a fact quite unremarked by the commentators ad loc.); the *TLL* article on *eo* quotes no instances, *Epod.* 1. being cited, without *inter*, at V.2. 635, 32, merely to illustrate *ire* = *navigare*. The Ovid passage is therefore a valuable pointer to the meaning of Horace's *ibis ... inter*; presumably *inter* here too indicates 'motion into' (as it does with *abiit* at *CLE* 1446.3-4). In addition, *inter* in this sense retains its affinity for the vocabulary of armament and attack, cf. Livy 1.13.1 *ausae* (sc. *Sabinae mulieres*) *se inter tela uolantia inferre*, 25.39.5 *incidunt inermes inter ceteras armatorum*, Tacitus, *Germ.* 24.1 *nudi iuuenes, quibus id ludicrum est, inter gladios se atque infesta frameas saltu iaciunt* (a sword dance). In these three last examples the sense demanded of *inter* is something like 'getting into the thick of'; this translation is also consistent with the Ovid and Virgil passages (though hostile intention on the part of the encircling elements is naturally absent there).

Applying our conclusions to *ibis ... inter* in *Epode* 1 the sense will be 'you will move into the thick of (Antony's) tall ships' - an accurate picture of a sea-battle, especially one involving the small swift-sailing Liburnians (see Appendix), which liked to move in close to their enemy, being obviously unsuited to long-range attacks: see, for example, Dio's account (50.32 passim) of the 'hit-and-run' tactics adopted by Octavian's vessels at Actium, and their fear of the enemy's missile strength at long range (Dio 50.32.4), and Plutarch, *Ant.* 65.5 (Octavian at Actium) βουλόμενος ... καὶ περιπλέον εὐθρεσι σκάφεσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συμπλέεσθαι πρὸς ναῦς ὑπ' ὄγκου καὶ πληρωμάτων ὀλιγότῃτος ἀργίας καὶ βραδείας.

Although the rejection of Thompson's interpretation of *ibis ... inter* removes his most substantial argument for challenging the traditional chronology of *Epode* 1, it remains to raise other objections, of a more general nature, to his dating. Firstly, if the *Epodes* were published, as is generally agreed, about 30 B.C., given that the opening poem refers to a sea-battle involving Octavian, it is asking a great deal of the audience to expect them, in the absence of any positive indication to this effect, to refer that battle not to the final conflict with Mark Antony in the preceding year, but to the campaign against Sex. Pompeius five years before that - unless, of course, Maecenas was with Octavian in the campaign against Sex. Pompeius but notoriously absent at Actium. Even so *Epode* 1 could still refer to Actium. The poem might have been written at a time when Maecenas intended to go, and although he was subsequently prevented, published anyway (this possibility is rejected by Thompson 329). Alternatively he might have gone but returned to Rome soon after (cf. Wistrand, *Horace's Ninth Epode* [Göteborg 1958], 19).

Secondly, Octavian did have big ships at Actium, as Thompson rightly points out. But the tradition on Actium in the historical sources is virtually unanimous in dwelling on the great superiority of Antony's vessels in height and weight over Octavians (Dio 50.18.5-6 & 23.2-3 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τῷ τε μεγέθει τῶν τοῦ Καίσαρος νεῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἐπιβατῶν αὐτοῦ ὁ Σεξτός οὐχ ἥμισυ ἦν ἡττητο, τὰ τε σκάφη κατεσκεύασε (Antony) πολλὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπερέχοντα (τριήρεις μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγας, τετρήρεις δὲ καὶ δεκίρεις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ διὰ μέσου πᾶντα ἐξεποίησε) καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὰ πύργους τε ὑψηλοὺς ἐπικατέσκευασε καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδράπων ἐπανεβίβασεν & 29.1ff., Plutarch, *Ant.* 65.4 καὶ τοῖς ὕψει καὶ μεγέθει τῶν οἰκείων νεῶν πεποιθότες ὡς ἀπρὸς μάχους (sc. Antony's soldiers), Florus, *Epit.* 4.11.5-6, Orosius 6.19.9, also Propertius 4.6.47: Virgil, who ascribes [*Aen.* 8.691ff.] large vessels to both sides, and Prudentius, in an idiosyncratic passage at *c. Symm.* 2.530-531, alone contradict the standard account); and the difference in the size of the vessels in the opposing fleets is also heavily emphasized in the accounts of the tactics adopted by each side in the actual fighting (Dio. 50.32.2ff. & 33.8, Plutarch, *Ant.* 66.2); our sources stress the superior speed and manoeuvrability of Octavian's vessels (Dio 50.32.2ff., Plutarch, *Ant.* 65.5), thinking, no doubt, in part at least, of his nimble Liburnians, which, we infer from various references to them, were present on his side at Actium in significant numbers (Propertius 3.11.44, Plutarch, *Ant.* 67.2, Vegetius, *re. mil.* 4.33; cf. also Horace, *Od.* 1.37.30). Indeed Vegetius (loc. cit.) appears to preserve a tradition that they were the decisive factor in the battle (for a similar judgement, without specific allusion to Liburnians, see Florus, *Epit.* 4.11.5ff.). In short, Liburnians figure prominently in the legend of Actium.

Now the contrast Octavian's Liburnians v Antony's big vessels is an over-simplification, as has been noted (cf. also J.M. Carter, *The Battle of Actium* [London 1970], 215, and especially W.W. Tarn, 'The Battle of Actium', *JRS* 21[1931], 193 n.8, who pertinently asks why Octavian should have constructed a new fleet for Actium instead of using his existing one, and in so doing have adopted the tactics of Sextus, whom he had defeated with a heavy navy), but it is not hard to see the tradition as already at work in Horace's *Liburnis ... alta nauium* | ... *propugnacula*, particularly since the tradition came into being very soon after Actium; this is apparent from Horace himself, *Od.* 1.37.30ff. *saeuis Liburnis ... inuidens deduci* κ.τ.λ., where *Liburnae* designates Octavian's fleet which - had she not committed suicide - would have carried Cleopatra back to Rome in triumph, and besides from Propertius, who says, 3.11.41ff., that Cleopatra *ausa ... baridos et contis rostra Liburna sequi*. The early genesis of the tradition is a further argument for referring 1-2 to Actium.

The opening couplet, then, pictures Octavian's Liburnians, small, nimble, light vessels, dwarfed by Antony's massive galleons at Actium. *alta nauium ... propugnacula* are the towers erected on the decks of the latter's polyremes (according to Dio 50.23.2, quoted above, Antony's fleet was composed of triremes to 'tens' [cf. 51.1.2 & Strabo 7.7.6 C.325]. according to Florus, *Epit.* 4.11.5, of 'sixes' to 'nines'). While this detail is not a direct reference to the superior size of Antony's ships, it is significant that, in our sources on Actium, mentions of Antony's *turres* is virtually inseparable from the idea of the immense magnitude of his craft (Dio 50.18.6 & 23.3,

- 68 Plutarch, *Ant.* 65.2, Florus, *Epit.* 4.11.5), and it was understood that towers were standard armament in the larger vessels; cf. Vegetius, *de re mil.* 4.44 in *maioribus etiam liburnis* (= 'in the larger vessels': *liburnae* in late writers becomes a generic term for all warships, cf. C.Torr, *Ancient Ships*² [Chicago 1964], 16) *propugnacula turresque constituunt ut tamquam de muro ita de excelsioribus tabulatis facilius uulnerent uel perimant inimicos*. These big ships stood high above the smaller Liburnians, and the towers augmented this natural advantage, enabling weapons to be flung down from a still greater height (Florus, *Epit.* 4.11.5 *quippe a senis in nouenos remorum ordines* [sc. Antony's ships], *ad hoc turribus atque tabulatis adleuatae*. Illustrations 130 and 132 in L. Casson's *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* [Princeton 1971] [from a 1st century B.C. relief found at Praeneste] give a good idea of what these towers must have looked like. See further Torr 59ff.). Horace is, in lines 1-2, touching effectively on the familiar, if historically questionable, contrast between Octavian's small ships and Antony's gigantic ones at Actium.

But this does not completely explain why Horace puts Maecenas on a Liburnian; after all, Octavian's fleet at Actium contained not just these, but biremes up to 'sixes': thus Florus, *Epit.* 4.11.6, and cf. supra for the size of the vessels used against Sextus Pompeius, and employed again at Actium. We might hold, with Mitscherlich ad loc., that Liburnians were selected because of their purportedly decisive role at Actium, but it is more consistent with the poetic intention of the opening lines to suppose that, by his choice of vessels to represent Octavian's fleet, Horace maximizes the disparity in the size of the ships under the opposing commanders. The dramatic effect of this is to make the odds appear heavily loaded against Octavian in the coming battle (contrast the description of the Liburnians as *saeuae* after the victory, *Od.* 1.37.30). All the more credit to Maecenas, then, for being prepared to follow his leader without hesitation, or thought for his personal safety (*paratus omne Caesaris periculum | subire, Maecenas, tuo*, 3-4).

Appendix: on Liburnians.

The *Liburna* proper (also called *Liburnica*) was a genuine bireme, thus a two-banked ship with two rows of oars, one above the other. For a technical account of it, see H.D.L.Viereck, *Die römische Flotte* (Herford 1975), 34ff.. Appian, *Illyr.* 3, explains the origin of the name and the characteristics of the vessel: *καὶ ναυτικοὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἀδριατικοῖς ἐγένοντο Λιβυρνοί, γένος ἑτερον Ἰλλυριῶν, οἱ τὸν Ἰόνιον καὶ τὰς νήσους ἐλπίστευον ναυσὶν ὠκείαις τε καὶ κούραις, ὅθεν ἔτι νῦν Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ κούρα καὶ ὀξεῖα δῖμροτα Λιβυρνίδας προσαγορεύουσιν*. See further S.Panciera, art. *Liburna* in *Dizionario Epigrafico di Antichità Romane* IV.31 (Rome 1958), and Torr 16.

2. Catullus 4.20-21

*et inde tot per impotentia freta
erum tulisse, laeva siue dextera
uocaret aura, siue utrumque Iuppiter 20
simul secundus incidisset in pedem*

The general sense of *siue utrumque ... pedem* is clear enough: 'or if the wind came down dead astern'. Not so clear are the attempts of the standard commentaries to explain the details. R.Ellis, *A Commentary on Catullus*² (Oxford 1889), states '<pedes> --- the sheets or ropes at each lower corner of the square sail habitually used in ancient ships. When a ship was sailing before the wind these would both be braced to the same length (*aequi*, Ovid *F.* III.565), and this is what Catullus expresses by the gale falling on them both at once'. C.J.Fordyce, *Catullus* (Oxford 1961), compresses this to 'i.e. the following wind falls square on the sail, making both the sheets (*pedes*) which braced its lower corners taut at the same length' (underlinings mine in both cases). The explanation is reiterated by W.Kroll (*C.Valerius Catullus, hrsg. u. erklärt von W.K.*, 6th ed., Stuttgart 1980), L.de Gubernatis, *Il Libro di Catullo* (Torino 1933), and (with variations) A.Riese, *Die Gedichte des Catullus* (Leipzig 1884); cf. also K.P.Schulze, *Römische Elegiker, eine Auswahl aus Catull, Tibull, Propertius* (Berlin 1879), 16, and A.Baehrens ad loc.. The latest commentator, K.Quinn (ed. 2, London 1973), is disappointingly nebulous.

In line with the above interpretations, successive commentaries (and most recently F.Heubner, *W.Z. Rostock* 27[1978], 541 n.22) quote the following passages in explanation of *utrumque in pedem*: Nonnus, *Dionys.* 4.231 *τοῦτων ἐνῶτερθε νεῶς πόδας*; Ovid, *Fast.* 3.565 *nacta ratem ... pede labitur aequo*, *ex Pont.* 4.5.3 *nec uos pedibus proceditis aequis*; Cicero, *Att.* 16.6.1 *utrumque* (sc. *sinum*) *pedibus aequis tramisimus*; and even Vergil, *Aen.* 4.587 *aequatis ... uelis*.

All this is somewhat confusing. Catullus makes no mention of *aequi pedes*, 'sheets braced to the same length'. What he does say is rather different, that the wind fell on both sheets alike. Much better illustrative material is to hand, some of it to be found already in *C.Valerius Catullus et in eum Isaac Vossii Observationes* (Lugduni Batavorum 1684) ad loc.. But commentators over the last hundred years or so have resolutely ignored it. Before adducing this, however, the discussion must be briefly placed in its nautical context.

The *pedes* (πόδες), as the commentators rightly observe, were the ropes ('sheets') attached to the lower corners (κατὰ τὰς γωνίας Schol. Apollonius Rhodius 1.567) of the ancient square sail (more usually rectangular or trapezoidal, cf. J.Rougé, *Ships and Fleets of the Ancient Mediterranean* [Middletown Conn. 1981], 54): thus Scholl. to Aristophanes *Eq.* 436 and Apollonius Rhodius 1.567, and, especially, Eustathius ad Homer *Od.* 5.260; cf. also Servius ad Vergil *Aen.* 5.830 and A.Oliver, *CW* 24(1930), 40 (for the different view that *pes* = the corner of the sail to which the sheet was attached, see Schol. Lycophron 1015, and Isidore, *Orig.* 19.3.4, with e.g. LSJ s.v. πός II.2, Baïf ap. A.Jal, *Glossaire Nautique* [Paris 1848], s.v., and Torr 96 n.206, who is, however, injudicious in his choice of examples).

An important function of the sheets was to regulate the amount of tension in the lower corners of the sail, by being either drawn tight (Sophocles, *Ant.* 715-7; Euripides, *Or.* 706), or slacked off (Euripides, *Or.* 707; Lucian, *Char.* 3: Casson fig.144 illustrates the point admirably). The *pedes* might be held by a crew-member (J.S.Morrison & R.T.Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* [Cambridge 1968], 56 & 312: Servius ad *Aen.* 3.510 *per sortem diuisi ad officia remigandi, qui esset proreta, quis*

pedem teneret) or made fast to bitts on the deck (Morrison & Williams, *Greek Oared Ships*, pl.16d; Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World*, 70 with fig.90; Apollonius Rhodius 1.566-7), but were not self-adjusting, as Fordyce appears to imply. By letting out one (consequently shortening the other), the sail could be angled to catch a wind from port or starboard: cf. Seneca, *Med.* 321-2 *prolato | pede transuersos captare notos (= uentos)*; naturally the yard arm had to be braced round at the same time, e.g. Lucan 8.193ff., Achilles Tatius 2.32.2.

The picture is further clarified by Aristotle *Mech.* 7.851b6ff., describing the procedures that were followed when the wind was not merely blowing at an angle across the vessel (t.t. 'on the quarter') but at 90° to the hull (t.t. 'on the beam') or even adverse: διὰ τί, ὅταν ἐξ οὐρίας βούλωνται διαδραμεῖν μὴ οὐρίου τοῦ πνεύματος ὄντος, τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὸν κυβερνήτην τοῦ ἱστίου μέρος στέλλονται, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν πῤῃραν ποδιαῖον ποιησάμενοι ἐφιᾶσιν; ἢ διότι ἀντιστῇ τὸ πηδάλιον πολλὰ μὲν ὄντι τῷ πνεύματι οὐ δύναται, ὀλίγῳ δέ, ὃ ὑποστέλλονται; in other words, when the wind was unfavourable, one half of the sail was drawn back towards the stern and furled, the other half (on the windward side, according to Casson 274 and Morrison & Williams 313: on the leeward, according to Torr, *Ancient Ships*², 96 n.206) angled towards the prow, so as to catch the wind, and unfurled: for the resultant triangular sail see Casson fig.188 (and, for a somewhat different reconstruction, Torr 95-6).

So much by way of introduction. In explaining Catullus 4.20-21 the following passages are of more assistance than those which the commentators cite: Lucan 5.427-8 *flexo nauita cornu | obliquat laeua pede carbasa*, 8.185-6 *sed quo uela dari, quo (= utro, cf. Francken ad loc.) nunc pede carbasa tendi | nostra iubet*?; Seneca, *Med.* 321-2 *prolato | pede transuersos captare notos*; Vergil, *Aen.* 5.830-1, depicting the same manoeuvre as Aristotle above, *una omnes fecere pedem* (ποδιαῖον ποιησάμενοι) *pariterque sinistros, | nunc dextros soluere* (ἐφιᾶσιν) *sinus*, where, pace OLD s.v. 12b, it is a question of using first one *pes*, then the other, to adjust the sail as the ship tacks, i.e. pursues a zig-zag course, to catch the wind as it falls alternately on either bow: see Casson 274 n.19 and especially Morrison & Williams 312-3, who are good on the significance of the singular here. Examples of the plural are: Apollonius Rhodius 2.931-2 *καὶ δ' ἄρα λαῖφος ἐρρυσάμενοι τανύοντο | ἐς πόδας ἀκροτέρους*; Lycophron 1011ff. *τὸν δ' αὖ ... Δίβυσσαν ψάμμιν δέξουσι πνοαί | θρήσσαι ποδωτοῖς ἐμφορούμεναι λίνοις* (where the geography seems to indicate a tail wind: note also the following lines); Schol. Aristophanes *Av.* 35 [ἀνεπτόμεθ' ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἀκροῖν τοῖν ποδοῖν] ἀπὸ μεταφοράς τῶν ὀρνέων ... ἢ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν· αἱ οὐριοδρομεῦσαι ἀκροῖν τοῖν ποδοῖν πλέουσιν; Quintus Smyrnaeus 9.436ff. *ἐπιπροέηκε δ' Ἀθήνη | ἐξόπιθεν πνεῖοντα τανυπάρου νεὸς οὖρον. | ἱστία δ' αἰψ' ἐτάνασαν ὑπ' ἀκροτέροισι πόδεσσι, | νῆα κατιθύνοντες εὐζυγον*.

Not all the examples are equally conclusive, but it seems a reasonable inference to draw from the above that the Greeks and Romans thought of a ship as utilizing only one *pes*, the one which was let out, to catch a transverse wind (n.b. especially Lucan's *quo pede carbasa tendi* and Seneca's *prolato pede ... captare notos*, with Lucan's specific identification at 5.428 of the left sheet as, in this case, the functional one; cf. also Turpilus ap. Isidore *Orig.* 19.4.3 *si quis propedon misit ... ueli sinistrum [= Ribbeck 215ff. q.v.]*) and both *pedes* to harness a following wind: see especially the Schol. to Aristophanes *Av.* 35 cited above. Or, to put it the other way round, as Lycophron and Catullus do, a cross-wind blew into one *pes*, a tail wind into both: it was surely of this, not of *aequi pedes*, that Catullus was thinking when he penned his *sive utrumque Iuppiter | simul secundus incidisset in pedem*.

Additional light is shed on this dichotomy by the passages of Aristotle and Vergil cited above. It was noted there that, when the wind was markedly unfavourable, a triangular sail was set, that portion of it which was to aft being furled. Now the effect of such a sail is to eliminate one of the two sheets which normally ran to the lower corners of the square sail. Or, as Morrison and Williams 312 put it, in their discussion of the singular in the expression *facere pedem*, 'There is no foot, i.e. point of attachment for a sheet, at the after corner of the sail since it is brailed up. The single foot is at the forward corner of the sail'. And indeed Isidore, *Orig.* 19.3.4, describing another type of triangular sail, the *siparum* or topsail (for the morphology see Housman, *Classical Papers* 996ff.), expressly states *siparum genus ueli unum pedem habens* - although he complicates the issue by treating *pes* as the *extremus angulus ueli*. Plainly, if the triangular sail employed for tacking could be said to have one *pes* only, then the wind must blow on it alone. The diametrical opposite would be, with Catullus, an *ὄρος* which engaged both sheets alike.

Finally, a few words on *simul*. The sense is not, with Ellis, 'at the same time', since this would seem to involve the improbable notion that, if the sail were angled to catch a side-wind, it would fall on each *pes* at marginally different moments. Presumably we should translate 'together, jointly' (as opposed to cases where the wind falls on one *pes* only): for the word in this sense see OLD s.v. 4.

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H. KONISHI (Fredericton N.B.): 'Ten years and a few more days': *Thucydides* 5.20.1

LCM 8.5 (May 1983), 69-70

Gomme's *Commentary* (4.17-23) gives the following dates as most probable:

a) Theban attack on Plataea c.8-9 March 431, b) Spartan invasion of Attica c.27-28 May 431, c) Peace of Nicias either x) c.10-15 March 421 or, if intercalated, y) c.10-15 April 421.

The problem is that the period between b) and c) has to be 'ten years and a few more days' according to *Thucydides* 5.20.1, but it is, in fact, about 48 days, if x), or 18 days, if y) less than ten years. The generally accepted solution is to strike out the phrase *ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἢ ἐσβολῇ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν* and assume that *Thucydides* thought that the War began from a), since the period between a) and c) is indeed the required length of time. This approach is too draconian, since

- 70 there is neither evidence that Thucydides felt the Theban attack on Plataia as the beginning of the War, nor any reason to suspect the MS reading (see Gomme 3.684). This paper suggests a solution without tampering with the text.

The period between b) and c) has either 3580 days, if x), or 3611 days, if y), by the Julian calendar (430, 426 and 421 being leap years in Julian years). Attested years in lunar calendars in Athens are sometimes 354 and sometimes 355 days, occasionally 353 days, and there are attested intercalary years of 383, 384 and 385 days (see W.K.Pritchett, *Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone*, p.362). To be approximately abreast of natural seasons ten years require 3652½ days (365.25 x 10), and the Athenian lunar calendar in ten years, including four intercalary years, has a possible minimum of 3640 days and a maximum of 3670 days. 'Ten years' means, therefore, either:

- i) 353, 354, 355 x 10 + 0 intercalary = 3530, 3540, 3550 days or
- ii) 353, 354, 355 x 10 + 1 intercalary = 3560, 3570, 3580 days or
- iii) 353, 354, 355 x 10 + 2 intercalaries = 3590, 3600, 3610 days or
- iv) 353, 354, 355 x 10 + 3 intercalaries = 3620, 3630, 3640 days or
- v) 353, 354, 355 x 10 + 4 intercalaries = 3650, 3660, 3670 days.

The actual number of days between b) and c) is either 3580, if x), or 3611, if y), days, and therefore Thucydides is entitled to say that 3580 or 3611 days are 'ten years and a few more days'. By supposing that there were less than three intercalaries between 431 and 421, his 'ten years and a few more days' can be anywhere between 3530 + x days and 3610 + x days.

Thucydides most likely counted the actual number of days (probably using his diary: 'I began recording the War almost immediately after it broke out' [1.1.1] cannot mean that he began writing the 'History', for he had not got enough material yet to start writing a history then. It can only mean that he started to take notes of the War, and I assume that the notes were recorded strictly on a daily basis) between the beginning and the end of the Archidamian War without relying on any calendar, or even on his seasonal system, which obviously cannot have the degree of precision implied in 'a few more days'. Then he divided the total of days by 353 ~ 361. The result was 10 with a small fraction left over - 'a few more days'. The problem of 5.20.1 is therefore caused by the uncritical assumption that Thucydides assigned c.365 days to a year, according to the Bouleutic Calendar.

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C.J.ROWE(Bristol): de Aristotelis in tribus libris Ethicorum dicendi ratione: *particles, connectives and style in three books from the Aristotelian ethical treatises*, PART IV, concluded from LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 54-57 LCM 8.5(May 1983), 70-74

II. Interchangeable / overlapping 'patterns of argument'

a. The drawing of inferences.

I collect together below twenty-seven ways in which Aristotle expresses inferences of one kind or another in the three sample books. Again, I do not claim that all the patterns listed are in any way exactly parallel; an 'inference' in the sense intended may vary in its degree of strength, ranging e.g. from 'A is the case; this is why people say B' to 'since A is the case, ἀνάγκη ὅρα B'. In some cases, indeed, the 'inference' is so weak as hardly to count as such at all; see especially my cautionary remarks about διό under I.a. above⁸⁰. It might be better to say, more loosely, that the patterns all represent ways of arguing from one idea / fact / assertion (A) to another (B); in this sense they are - for the most part - all either interchangeable or at least overlapping in use.

TABLE VI	NE IV	AE A	EE III
A / ⁸¹ B ὅρα	1	19	0
B / A γάρ	165	127	89
B / καὶ γάρ A	6	6	13
B / A γούν	2	0	1
A / B ὅτ ⁸²	14	5	4
A / διὰ τοῦτο (and variants, e.g. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο) B	3	8	0
A / διό B	11	15	14
A / διότι B	2	0	1
εἰ A, B	1	4	1
εἴπερ ('given', 'if indeed') A, B	1	0	0
B, εἴπερ A	2	2	1
ἐπεὶ A, B	1	8	9
ἐπειδὴ A, B	0	0	1
B / ἐπεὶ A	0	2	2

80. See LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 55.

81. The oblique stroke in each case indicates a break either between 'sentences' or between clauses.

82. I.e. ὅτ as under I.a. above, LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 54-55.

TABLE VI continued

	NE IV	AE A	EE III	71
B, <u>ὅτι</u> A	4	14	8	
<u>ὅτι</u> A, (<u>διὰ</u> τοῦτο) B	0	1	0	
B, <u>διότι</u> A	0	(1) ⁸³	1	
A / B <u>οὖν</u>	24	20	8	
A / B <u>τοίνυν</u>	0	3	0	
A / <u>ὥστε</u> (connective) B	2	22	10	
A (genitive absolute, with the meaning 'since / if A'), B	7	3	2	
A, B ('x, being y, is ...')	1	0	1	
B, A ('x is ..., being y')	2	0	0	
B, A <u>γε</u> <u>ὅν</u> (causal participial clause)	3	0	0	
B, A (where A is expressed by means of a causal relative clause with <u>γε</u>)	2	0	0	
B, <u>ὡς</u> A <u>ὅν</u>	3 ⁸⁴	1 ⁸⁴	0	
B <u>διὰ</u> τὸ A <u>εἶναι</u>	4	1	6	
	261	263	172	

If we may assume that broadly speaking any of these patterns is substitutable for any other (i.e. if we ignore, for the sake of argument, cases where they merely overlap, and special cases of individual items), the total numbers of cases of all twenty-seven patterns, taken together, in the three books are proportionately comparable. We may then begin to look for significant differences in the distribution of the patterns.

We may first divide them into three broad types: type I, 'A / therefore (hence) B'; type II 'B / for (because) A'; and type III, 'since (if) A, B'.

TABLE VII

	NE IV	AE A	EE III
I.			
1. A / B <u>ἄρα</u>	1	19	0
2. A / B <u>οὖν</u>	14	5	4
3. A / <u>διὰ</u> τοῦτο B	3	8	0
4. A / <u>διό</u> B	11	15	14
5. A / <u>διόπερ</u> B	2	0	1
6. A / B <u>οὖν</u>	24	20	8
7. A / B <u>τοίνυν</u>	0	3	0
8. A / <u>ὥστε</u> B	2	22	10
	57	92	37
II.			
1. B / A <u>γάρ</u>	165	127	89
2. B / <u>καὶ</u> γάρ A	6	6	13
3. B / A <u>οὖν</u>	2	0	1
4. B / <u>ἐπεὶ</u> A	0	2	2
5. B, <u>ὅτι</u> A	4	14	8
6. <u>ὅτι</u> A, B ⁸⁵	0	1	0
7. B, <u>διότι</u> A	0	(1)	1
8. B, A ('x is ..., being y')	2	0	0
9. B, A <u>γε</u> <u>ὅν</u>	3	0	0
10. B, A (causal relative clause with <u>γε</u>)	2	0	0
11. B <u>ὡς</u> A <u>ὅν</u>	3	1 ⁸⁶	0
12. B <u>διὰ</u> τὸ A <u>εἶναι</u>	4	1	6
	191	153	120
III.			
1. <u>εἰ</u> A, B	1	4	1
2. <u>εἴπερ</u> A, B	1	0	0
3. B, <u>εἴπερ</u> A ⁸⁷	2	3	1
4. <u>ἐπεὶ</u> A, B ⁸⁸	1	8	9
5. <u>ἐπειδὴ</u> A, B	0	0	1
6. A (genitive absolute), B	7	3	2
7. A, B ('x, being y, is ...')	1	0	1
	13	18	15

We may deal with type III first, as in numerical terms the least important. All type III

83. = 1138a21: not strictly of the type in question, but arguably related to it.

84. I.e. excluding cases of ὡς + participle = 'on the grounds that ...' (see I.d. above, LCM 8.4 (Apr. 1983), 57.

85. I treat this as an unimportant variant of II.5.

86. = 1137b9, where the participle should perhaps not be treated as causal.

87. Included under type III for the reason given below, p.72.

88. Distinguished from II.4 on the grounds that the ἐπεὶ-clause in II.4 merely adds confirmation of an assertion, whereas here it provides a premise in a deduction.

- 72 patterns are used chiefly in order to bring in earlier conclusions with a view to building further ones: 'such and such being the case / if indeed it is the case (as we said) ...', etc. This is true even of III.1., with one exception in AE A (1129a21). *ἐπεὶ* is used in the same way whether its clause precedes or follows the main clause; except that twice (once in NE IV, once in AE A) it means 'if, as can be assumed as given ...' (of the uses of III.4., too, the one in NE IV, two of those in AE A, and three of those in EE III involve new points, as sometimes do 'causal' genitive absolutes, as e.g. at NE IV 1127b33-34). There are, of course, as we have seen, other ways in which Aristotle refers back to earlier conclusions; especially by using *ὡςπερ*, etc.. Perhaps, however, these other methods are appropriate when the earlier conclusion was reached some time before; whereas the present patterns are employed when the reference is to conclusions more recently reached, or in the course of the same argument. In any case, we may say that if Aristotle wants to say 'given such and such ...' (i.e. whether referring back to previous conclusions or not), 'such and such other thing follows', he will typically prefer to use the pattern *ἐπεὶ* A, B in AE A and EE III, but may use other patterns, while in NE IV he will perhaps prefer to use the pattern A (genitive absolute), B, but may use other patterns. We thus appear largely to confirm that the reason for the dissimilarity between NE IV and the other two books over the use of *ἐπεὶ* is stylistic; we may also have found a 'pair' for this stylistic difference, i.e. the use of A (genitive absolute), B, although the differences here are not so marked, and the totals are too small to permit the usual statistical test.

If we now turn to what I have called types I and II, the first point to be made is that while the differences between the total numbers of all arguments (understood as examples of the items listed) belonging to the two types - or indeed to all three - in the three books are insignificant, by the same measure AE A contains a significantly higher number of examples of the patterns under type I than do the other two. It is likely, however, that this merely corroborates the point made earlier about the greater argumentativeness of AE A, deriving from the nature of the topic with which it deals⁸⁹. If there are real stylistic indicators here, they will again be in the incidence of particular items. On this basis, the significant differences (under types I and II) between the sample books are as follows:

- i. the preference for I.1. in AE A;
- ii. the rarity of I.8. in NE IV; and
- iii. the relatively high incidence of II.1. in NE IV.

We may go on to add three further differences to the list, which though not significant by the usual measure may warrant further investigation in other books:

- iv. the relatively greater liking shown for I.2. by NE IV;
- v. the relatively greater liking shown for II.5. by AE A and EE III;
- and vi. an apparently greater liking in NE IV for types of causal participial clauses (II.8., 9., 11.).

Of these differences, i., ii. and iv. have been dealt with under I.a above⁹⁰. On iii.: the figures for *γὰρ* simple clearly leave NE IV the odd man out, and it may well be right to continue treating this difference too as a stylistic one (with *ὅτι* / *διότι* [= II.5. / 6. / 7.] as pair?). But a qualification is needed. If we count the figures for *γὰρ* simple with those for *καὶ γὰρ* (which is perhaps just a minor variant of it), the resulting totals now become only slightly irregular by the chi-squared test; and by another test used by Kenny the differences could in fact be treated as mere chance variations⁹¹. Further, it may be that we are using the wrong basis for the comparison of the figures for *γὰρ* (simple). It is the normal function of *γὰρ* to link 'sentences'; we therefore perhaps need to count occurrences of *γὰρ* as proportions of the total numbers of 'sentences' in each book, rather than as proportions of the total number of words, since a book which contains shorter 'sentences' will offer correspondingly more occasions for its deployment (as also for the deployment of other words of the same type, like *ἀρα*, *οὖν*, etc.; if I have not used this measure elsewhere, it is because it has no radical effect on the situation, as it does here).

If we work on this new basis, the totals for *γὰρ* in the three sample books are entirely regular instead of irregular⁹². That is, the evidence of these three books is consistent with the hypothesis that differences in the incidence of *γὰρ* will be determined by whatever factors account for differences between average lengths of 'sentences'⁹³. On the other hand, 'sentence'-length is itself likely to be a function of style; thus, if the incidence of *γὰρ* varies with 'sentence'-length, it will to that extent still be (indirectly) an indicator of style. We may go further: one obvious possible cause of variation in 'sentence'-length is the incidence of subordinate clauses; and a higher incidence of subordinate clauses, which increased 'sentence'-length, might well be expected specifically to include a higher incidence of causal subordinate clauses, which in

89. See above, *LCM* 8.3(Mar.1983), 37, 8.4(Apr.1983), 55.

90. See above, *LCM* 8.4(Apr.1983), 55.

91. Chi-squared value 9.30 (value of 9.21 significant). Standard error formula (Kenny pp.82ff.): NE IV, 2.86, s.e. 0.22; AE A, 2.07, s.e. 0.18; EE III, 2.18, s.e. 0.21.

92. NE IV, 165 occurrences of *γὰρ* (simple) in 464 'sentences'; AE A, 127 in 442; EE III, 89 in 269; chi-squared = 3.14.

93. In other words, the normal application of the binomial assumption (Kenny pp.89-90) may be inappropriate here; increasing the size of the sample will in this case only compound the problem.

turn would be likely to affect the incidence of 'sentences' beginning with γάρ - and here we should again notice the relatively high totals for (causal) ὅτι-clauses in AE A and EE III⁹⁴.

We may make some further observations of a minor nature on the uses of causal ὅτι. Of the cases in NE IV, one is to some extent special⁹⁵; while διαφέρειν ... ὅτι ... at 1126b22 compares with EE III διαφέρειν τῷ + infinitive (once) and διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ + infinitive (also once)⁹⁶. On the other hand, with the 14 cases of II.5. in AE A we should reckon the one case of II.6.; with the 8 cases in EE III, we should count the one case of II.7.. We may also note 4 cases in AE A of the special pattern διὰ τοῦτο (and variants, referring back to a previous assertion) ..., ὅτι ... (where the ὅτι-clause reasserts or expands τοῦτο). (One further type of pattern of argument which belongs in this same area is αὐτίκιν δ' ὅτι ... and variants, occurring 3 times in AE A; though ὅτι in such cases is clearly not itself causal.).

Finally, difference vi.: this difference is hardly noteworthy in itself, given the smallness of the figures involved, but may gain in significance if connected with NE IV's (slight) tendency towards causal genitive absolutes on which I remarked above.

b. 'Not A but B', 'B but / and not A'.

We noticed earlier that AE A has a significantly higher incidence of simple ἀλλά than the other two sample books, though EE III was marginally closer to it than NE IV. Most commonly, simple ἀλλά occurs after a negative, whether expressed or implied; but it also occurs preceding a negative, and occasionally with no negative either following or preceding⁹⁷. In at least the first two cases, but especially in the second, a competitor with ἀλλά is δέ; and indeed in all three books δέ preceding a negative is rather commoner than ἀλλά, even excluding contexts with a contrasting μέν. Another source of variation lies in the fact that 'not A but B' and 'B but not A' are themselves in principle mutually substitutable.

Again, in the second pattern καί may substitute for ἀλλά. I do not, however, detect any real differences in the handling of these options between the three books⁹⁸. If AE A has rather more cases of ἀλλά preceding a negative, this is perhaps due to a combination of the factors accounting for the generally high incidence of ἀλλά there⁹⁹ with other special factors accounting for the use of ἀλλά in certain contexts; the operation of the latter happens largely to be restricted to AE A, but the numbers are in any case too small to matter. In particular, ἀλλά is perhaps generally stronger and more emphatic than δέ. This is certainly a plausible explanation of ἀλλά when it substitutes for δέ corresponding to μέν (another variant is οὐ μέντοι ..., or ... μέντοι ... οὐ). Elsewhere, Aristotle may tend to use ἀλλά in order to allow stress to fall on the phrase which carries the burden of the contrast being introduced, where if δέ were used it would be too long delayed. (A similar factor may sometimes also be involved in substitutions of ἀλλά for δέ in cases of ... μέν ... δέ.).

Two further patterns: firstly, οὐ μὴν ... γε, for strong 'but not ...', 'but ... not ...', which as we saw occurs 5 times in NE IV and not at all in either AE A or EE III. Secondly, there is the pattern οὐκ ἔστι / ἂν εἴη δέ ..., which occurs 5 times in NE IV, 3 times with οὐδέ (οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδέ ...). When used with οὐδέ, it is presumably a stronger variant of simple οὐδέ ... (or οὐδέ ... δέ ..., once in NE IV); or else, as at 1128b33, it means 'But neither ...', with which we may compare EE III 1231a4 ἀλλ' οὐδέ When used on its own, it functions as the negative version of e.g. εἴη δ' ἂν ..., as at 1128b29 εἴη δ' ἂν ... / οὐκ ἔστι δέ Compare here AE A 1134b27 τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν (οὕτως ἔχον), and 1137a6 τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. But then again, notice οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἐν-αντίος οὐδέ (Spengel, rightly, for οὕτε)¹⁰⁰ ... at EE III 1233a21, ἔστι δέ ... at 1233a31.

CONCLUSIONS

In so far as they are founded simply on raw counts of lexical items, little now appears to remain of Kenny's arguments as he explicitly represents them in chapter 4 of his book. On the basis of the sample books, only with respect to three of his twenty-four chosen words, γάρ, ἐπεὶ and ὥστε, do such counts come anywhere near to showing anything by themselves. In all the other twenty-one cases, either there are no clearly significant differences in frequency of use, or, where there are significant differences, these are for a variety of reasons unusable for the argument. At one point Kenny supports his case by means of bar charts showing the effects of inserting AE into NE and EE respectively, using ἐπεὶ and ὥστε as base; striking though the illustration

94. See above, *LCM* 8.4 (Apr. 1983), 55, b. Also, of course, the significantly higher totals for ἐπεὶ = 'since', 'if', also given there.

95. See above, *LCM* 8.4 (Apr. 1983), 57, d.

96. But again τῷ + infinitive for διὰ τὸ + infinitive at NE IV 1124a9.

97. ἀλλά preceding a negative, 1 (or 0: see n.47 above, *LCM* 8.3 (Mar. 1983), 37) / 14 / 3; no negative (see above, *LCM* 8.1 [Jan. 1983], 6, l. a. ii, *LCM* 8.4 [Apr. 1983], 57 n.79), 1 / 6 / 5.

98. A rough count for καί *vice* ἀλλά gives 5 cases in NE IV, 3 in AE A, 2 in EE III.

99. See above, *LCM* 8.3 (Mar. 1983), 37.

100. The caution expressed in n.36 above (*LCM* 8.1 [Jan. 1983], 10) is really unnecessary; certainly, if Bywater instead of Susemihl had edited EE, we would be reading οὐδέ.

74 illustration is, it is true to say that there is no other single item from the list which he could have used to the same dramatic effect¹⁰¹. Even with ἐπεὶ and ὥστε, a certain amount of sorting has to be done before the proper figures for comparison emerge: ὥστε is not always used to substitute for οὖν, etc. (its leading use); and ἐπεὶ can have a temporal as well as a causal sense (we should also still keep in mind the variant ἐπειδὴ, which as things stand constitutes a further unknown factor if we are considering the implications of the general pattern of use of ἐπεὶ).

Nevertheless, it appears likely that something can be made at least of the cases of ἐπεὶ and ὥστε; and even if they represented the whole of Kenny's haul in this area, such apparently meagre results would be interesting enough. Though a larger number of positive findings would be more obviously striking, any total greater than nought would be hard to ignore¹⁰². And my analysis of the sample books suggests that there may in fact be more arguments available to support Kenny's position once the remaining books of NE, AE and EE have been investigated to the same depth. Computer-generated concordances should allow the lines of investigation suggested to be followed up fairly easily.

We should finally add, however, that unless and until the analysis is extended in this way, the argument is not finished, for two reasons. Firstly, there is the possibility (which we have seen realized in one or two cases)¹⁰³ that the books chosen as samples may be unrepresentative of NE, AE and EE as wholes. But a second and more worrying reason is that we may not be right to assume (as I have done from the beginning) that the three groups of books are wholes at all. At the same time as supposedly uncovering a handful of apparent stylistic differences between NE and AE + EE, it happens that we have also found features in respect of which there are as great or even greater differences between books within these hypothetically unified groups¹⁰⁴. Further analysis might turn up other examples, and it would be a matter of judgement how many the hypothesis could bear without becoming untenable¹⁰⁵. If that limit is passed - as it plainly would have been, had we been forced to accept Kenny's results, at least for NE, at the value he appeared to want to place on them -, then we shall wake up and find we were playing the wrong ball-game altogether.

Kenny himself seems hospitable¹⁰⁶ to the suggestion that NE may fall into groups of books; if this were the case, the question would not be whether the style of AE associates it with EE or with NE *simpliciter*, but whether it associates it with EE or with any of the constituent parts of NE, or perhaps relatively more with some or all of them. The question would change still further if it turned out that either EE or AE as well, or both, were patchworks. On the whole, however, there appear to be no real grounds for raising these latter possibilities¹⁰⁷. It happens that it is also my intuition, as it is that of many others, that NE is an organic whole, which may or may not have been patched or added to in places. But then it was my intuition that AE belonged to NE (in the sense of being written of a piece with it); a view to which other parts of Kenny's book, if not the part on which I have centred in this paper, deal a near-lethal blow¹⁰⁸.

101. γάρ is a possible candidate, but the results here would be rather less clear. Another possible candidate is ἀλλά; but on the evidence of the sample books the conditions affecting its use are sufficiently complex to prevent us from drawing any straightforward conclusions - at least at this stage - from its pattern of incidence alone.

102. I.e. against the background of a generally very uniform style (above, *LCM* 8.4[Apr.1983], 54).

103. See n.49 above (*LCM* 8.3[Mar.1983], 37) and also *LCM* 8.4(Apr.1983), 57, iv.

104. See above, *LCM* 8.4(Apr.1983), 55 (ἀρα), 56 (καθάπερ, ὥπερ).

105. Cf. Eucken's results for NE, referred to by Kenny 72ff..

106. Kenny 72ff.

107. On the irregularity of the incidence of ἀρα in AE, see above, *LCM* 8.4(Apr.1983), 55. But note e.g. the abnormally low incidence recorded by Kenny of the prize exhibit ἐπεὶ in EE I (i.e. in contrast with the other books of EE).

108. See n.2 above (*LCM* 8.1[Jan.1983], 4. To the degree that I am now inclined to accept Kenny's solution to the problem of AE, I must reject my own, developed in *The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics* (n.59 above, *LCM* 8.3[Mar.1983], 39), which presupposed an original EE version of AE, now lost; although I believe, *contra* Kenny, that there may be some evidence of at least a Nicomachean recension of AE (see the review referred to in n.57 above, *LCM* 8.3[Mar.1983], 39). (I also unreservedly withdraw the remark in n.4 on p.13 of the same monograph, which suggested that 'of course' stylistic criteria could not be brought to bear on problems of authenticity in the Aristotelian *corpus*; the kind of work being done by Kenny clearly now offers at least the promise of results in this direction.) At the same time, I am not inclined to withdraw my general hypothesis about the relationship between NE and EE (i.e. disregarding AE), which treated NE as a later reworking of EE material. If it was over-hasty to assume that the methods used to support it could be extended to the problem of AE, I believe them still to be useful for the purpose to which they were first applied.

The fourth elegy of the last book of Propertius exhibits a number of problems, some of which have been noticed in editions. However, a number of difficulties have either been ignored, or explained away in the usual manner ('peculiar Propertian technique'). It is with some of these points that this paper will deal.

The first section of the poem (lines 1-16) has, clearly enough, been confused at some stage in its transmission, owing to the fact that there is more than one source of water alluded to in the area, as Postgate's text first recognizes. Shackleton Bailey, in his illuminating discussion (*Propertiana* 233-4), has missed this. J.L. Marr has acknowledged it (*CQ* ns20 [1970], 165ff.), but, since he retains lines 17-18 in their vulgate position, he has not restored complete order. Lines 17-18 are ridiculous where they stand, since they anticipate the whole story (Goold, *Noctes Propertianae*, *HSCP* 71 [1966], 88 & 97-8), and we may therefore assume that Postgate was right, since his ordering restores complete sense and logic to the area. Why were the lines confused in the first place? It seems that some scribe, confused by the mention of two *fontes*, thought he was restoring sense by turning them into one, and Goold has, rightly it seems, explained the migration of lines 17-18.

It is reasonable to assume that such a pseudo-editor as Goold has envisaged would not confine his efforts to one part of the poem. His interference will also explain the most serious problem to be discussed below. If we turn to lines 69-70, we read that the goddess (whether she be Vesta or Venus) 'fed the crime by planting more torches in her [sc. Tarpeia's] bones'. The consequence of this should surely be that she should do something worse. However, by line 70 the die has already been cast: she has completed her treason by telling Tatius how (lines 49-50) and when (lines 47-8) to take the Capitol. What further wickedness is there left for her to do?

From this little inconsistency I now turn to Tarpeia's 'soliloquy'. Until line 46 everything progresses sensibly: she addresses the fires, tents and weapons of Tatius, which she can see *ex arce*, and resolves to betray her city and the fires of Vesta. In line 47, however, she addresses Tatius personally, and continues to do so until the end of the monologue. This is peculiar, since she can hardly *flere ex arce* and address Tatius at the same time. She would have to have actually met him, as most of the other versions of the story say that she did, to arrange the bargain.

Propertius does mention a bargain, but obscurely, and at the end of the elegy (lines 81-82). However, lines 47-66 are themselves the bargain or *pacta* there referred to, and it should now follow that Tarpeia makes not one speech but two, the former a soliloquy, in which she determines to betray the hill for love, the latter an address to Tatius, in which she does just that. In the first section (lines 31-46), she envisages herself as merely a 'captive' of Tatius (ambiguously, since Tatius has captured her *facie*, as well as, in her imagination, *armis*), and only contemplates treachery. In lines 47-66, the pact is made, and she is demanding, as her due, to be his wife. Logically, lines 69-70 should come somewhere between the two speeches.

This does not, unfortunately, seem to be the end of the problem; lines 23-28 are also out of place. Propertius depicts Tarpeia falling in love with Tatius at first sight: her soliloquy should come directly after this - '*Chi osserva attentamente, il passaggio dal primo innamoramento di Tarpeia alle sue smanie posteriori è assai brusco ed inopportuno: brusco, perchè la narrazione di quei furori amorosi vien in mezzo ad un tratto, impreparata ed inaspettata; inopportuno, perchè interrompe quasi nel punto più drammatico il racconto dell'innamoramento di Tarpeia*' (Vivona, *Studi Propertiani* [1901], 52). I would therefore place the lines after line 70.

This introduces the question of the validity of lines 71-2. In the vulgate, they must refer to Venus (or Vesta) in the preceding couplet. The *exemplum* of these lines is an Amazon, as *abscisso pectus aperta sinu* (pectus Hertzberg, cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 1.408; *fertur* MSS) and *Thermodonta* make clear. *Strymonis* is possibly due to Propertius' misunderstanding of Vergil, *Aeneid* 9.659, or possibly simply a licence. The question should now be whether Propertius would have compared any of the personages in this poem to an Amazon, and the answer must surely be that he would not. Housman placed the lines after elegy 8.52 of this book, where they fit perfectly (describing the wrathful Cynthia of that poem), but Camps, although he says as much in his note ad loc. ('... and when [Amazons] are described by poets in mad career, it is usually in the context of a military assault') does not seem to consider this possibility. If lines 23-28 are moved to follow line 70, then the *hirsutis brachia sarta rubis* of line 28 may have suggested to a scribe that lines 71-2, being in a similar vein, should properly come after this line. The subsequent removal of lines 23-28 to their vulgate position left lines 71-2 with no referend but the Venus of line 69.

Thus the whole section from line 67 to line 82, including also lines 23-28 which I would move thither, should be placed between line 46 and line 47. An objection will doubtless be raised to my making a division at line 66, since *incerto somno* of line 67, as it follows *somnum* in line 65, would seem to indicate that all is in order. Yet, if Tarpeia has just given Tatius precise instructions for the capture of the hill, and told him, moreover, that she would like to dream about him, her sleep would not then be *incertus*; *incertus somnus* is the lot of the love-sick, and would therefore be more applicable to the Tarpeia we see in lines 31-46.

In any case, why is Tarpeia trying to sleep, when, according to most commentators (as they understand *comes* in line 82), she should be helping Tatius to take the hill? She was obviously awake when he arrived (lines 89-91), but did she personally accompany Tatius up the hill? *comes* is no clue, since it may well mean no more than 'accessory'. *pacta* in the same line only shows that Propertius is playing on a specific sense of the participle of *paciscor* as well as the general sense (in effect, part of the *pacta* which Tarpeia makes with Tatius is that she should be *pacta*, 'betrothed', to him herself).

If we turn to lines 83-4, the vulgate offers us the following:

*mons erat ascensu dubius festoque remissus:
nec mora, uocales occupat ense canes.*

- 76 The hexameter here is inconsistent with the pentameter, since it gives us no idea as to who the subject of *occupat* is likely to be. As the hexameter stands, it must mean 'the ascent of the hill was uncertain and it was unguarded (?) because of the holiday'. However, *remissus* cannot mean 'unguarded' here (Housman's *ascensum monstrat dubio* ..., with Tarpeia as its subject, does not take this into account, and may be disregarded). Bailey's conjecture, *custos-* for *festo-*, solves the local difficulty, but the harsh asyndeton between hexameter and pentameter remains. Add to this the fact that some of the major MSS read *remissis* for no apparent reason, and it becomes clear that (probably) two lines have dropped out of the text, possibly due to the homoeoteleuton of lines 82 and 84. This, together with the absence of lines 17-18 from the area (they should precede line 87), has contributed to the general chaos. Marr (*CQ* ns20[1970], 165ff.) would have Tarpeia as the subject of line 84, but this is improbable, as it attributes a little too much bravado to our heroine. The missing lines will have told how Tatius actually entered the gate, since he is outside it at line 83, but inside (he kills the watchdogs) at line 84.

I hope that the poem thus rearranged will make more sense than the one which the vulgate offers us. There remains, however, one minor problem which I would like to tackle, if only because I have always assumed, perhaps naively, that the answer is obvious. Lines 23-4 are two excuses offered by the love-sick Tarpeia to enable her to go back to her *nemus* in order to get another look at Tatius; that they are, in fact, excuses is shown by *causata est* and *tingendas dixit ... comas*. What Tarpeia says she wishes to do in line 24 is obvious to everyone, but editors are united in their complete incomprehension as to the meaning of line 23; 'it is hard to guess what omens of the moon she might plead that would not be visible to everyone ... but clearly her excuse is one that will permit her to leave the fortress ...' (Richardson, *Elegies I-IV*, 436). What exactly are these *omina Lunae*, and why should they take her to the grove? I believe that they refer, not to bad dreams, but to menstruation and to the (doubtless) elaborate cleansing rituals which it would entail, for which she would obviously need water. Solitude was possibly also a necessity. The moon's influence was, to the ancients, predominantly feminine, and the moon was, therefore, connected with female activities such as childbirth and menstruation (see especially W.H. Roscher, *Studien zur griechischen Mythologie und Kulturgegeschichte*, Heft 4, Leipzig 1890, 55-9).

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Review: Pamela M. Huby (Liverpool)

LCM 8.5 (May 1983), 76-77

Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.

pp. xxiv + 704: paper, £9.95. ISBN 0 7100 9200 8

This is the second edition of a fine book, that deserved to be made available in a cheaper and more convenient form, and I shall first notice how it differs from the first edition. It contains the original two volumes in one, reorganized for greater convenience and considerably revised. The Bibliography has been extended to 1981, the Indexes have been redone, and some errors of fact have been corrected within the text. There is also some new material on pp. xvii-xxi, which could not be incorporated in the text. Much of this is important, and the serious reader should mark the relevant pages and refer back when appropriate. Apart from what is noticed below, the most important points are 1) a reinterpretation of Heraclitus B 101, from 'I searched by myself' to 'I enquired into myself', i.e. 'I engaged in introspection'; 2) the recognition that Sextus' version of Gorgias' *Concerning What is Not* is thoroughly Sextan, and cannot give us Gorgias' own words; 3) some alterations in the interpretation of Melissus.

The book is in a series, *The Arguments of the Philosophers*, and justifiably concentrates on arguments. Any writer on Presocratic arguments faces three problems: first, that shared with all historians of philosophy, the need to interpret earlier thinkers in modern terms, with the subsidiary problem of whether to aim at making them available especially for contemporary readers, or to try to produce something which will hold its interest for generations to come; secondly, the difficulty, peculiar to the Presocratics, that they are the first philosophers known to us, and that therefore there is no tradition in which to set them; finally, one shared with classical scholars in many fields, that the material is fragmentary, so that we do not know more than a fraction of what these philosophers wrote, and believe, indeed, that some of them wrote nothing.

Barnes' solution to these difficulties is to provide a philosophical setting which might be called Locke and logic. Locke is quoted far more than any other post-classical philosopher. This does not, crudely, make the Presocratics honorary British empiricists, but it does help us to know where we are, both with them and with Barnes, and it also removes his book far enough from the merely fashionable to ensure its interest for future philosophers. Barnes also makes skilful use of logical techniques. He does not imply that the Presocratics were as sophisticated as he is, but he ascribes to them, or to most of them, the skill in applied logic that any good philosopher must have. He sets out to draw the limits of what they might have said, and discusses a range of alternative interpretations of the material we have. He sees that this is not just a necessary preliminary for a book of this kind, but a fruitful part of it. Where certainty cannot be reached, a map of the possibilities is far better than a single conjectural account.

Some have complained that by this approach he ignores the 'darker', or the 'visionary, poetic, inventive' aspect of their thought, but that is not true: he uses logic as a yardstick to measure them as philosophers, and when he finds them wanting he does not hesitate to say so. Inevitably some arbitrariness creeps in here: many of the early ones, at least, as he sees, probably expressed themselves pretty vaguely, and were asking pretty vague questions, but the sparseness of our material prevents certainty about this.

As a result, prizes are awarded to some philosophers not traditionally favoured, while others are demoted. Thus Barnes places Anaximenes above Thales and Anaximander, and sees him as the great

brain of the Milesians. Xenophanes, frequently treated as an obscure figure of questionable attainments, becomes a profound thinker (but Barnes does not discuss how he arrived at such sophisticated views so early, nor how he failed to have the effect on Plato that one might expect). Heraclitus is demoted from being obscure to being merely vague: he is an inconsistent but profound paradoxographer. Pythagoras fares badly: he was not a mathematician or a scientist, and was only outstanding for his belief in metempsychosis. His followers also suffer. They were 'students rather than professors of the mathematical arts', and much of their number philosophy was jejune and inane. Barnes originally rescued one of them, Philolaus, to the extent of defending the authenticity of the fragments attributed to him, and crediting him with the discovery of Aristotelian 'form'. But even this is withdrawn in the new Preface, with some regret, on philological grounds. Alcmeon, on the other hand, goes up, having produced an argument for the immortality of the soul as clever as any other known to Barnes, without any predecessors in the field.

But for all but the most superficial readers these conclusions are less important than the discussions which precede them, and in them enough scholarly and philosophical material is usually provided to enable one to judge for oneself. The rare exceptions are due in part at least to the decision to have the notes at the back of the book, not at the foot of the page. This suggests that different methods of writing are called for when the notes are not easily accessible. A case in point is the discussion of the ethical sayings attributed to Democritus. It is only in a note at the back that we are made aware that many scholars doubt whether these are in fact his, and that some are attributed to 'Democrates'. Guthrie has an excellent account of this complicated matter, and one sentence mentioning this in the main body of the text would have made a vast difference.

This brings me to a comparison with Guthrie. Barnes owes a lot to him, as he acknowledges, and this book is no substitute for Guthrie's. It does not pretend to be thorough, long though it is. Further, it extends beyond Guthrie's *Presocratics* proper to include the Sophists. Indeed, the chronological table which Barnes gives includes thirty-five characters, excluding Socrates and Plato, and of these only twenty-three were probably born before Socrates, and a slightly different set of twenty-three probably died before him. The 'Postsocratics' include, as is the convention, the Atomists, but also the shadowy Lycophron, Diagoras the Atheist, some later Pythagoreans, and Cratylus.

Minor matters:

1. On p.125 Barnes suggests that a 'metempsychotic killer' might have defended the killing of a sheep on the grounds that it enabled the soul involved to advance. He could have added that Porphyry, *On Abstinence* I.19, reports a similar view, perhaps from Heracleides Ponticus, that a soul imprisoned in an animal would welcome the killing and eating of the animal to hasten its own return to human existence.
2. That Cinderella of the sixpenny shelves, Drachmann's *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity*, comes into its own at last with Barnes' commendation, but I regret the eclipse of A.E.Taylor's *Varia Socratica* - as much Presocratic as Socratic - and of Benjamin Farrington's *Greek Science*.
3. The page references in the Index to other parts of the Index seem to be out by 1.
4. The free bookmark, which carries the skeletons of two complicated arguments for reference while reading, does not stand up well to continuous use, and should be kept for when it is needed.

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D.P.FOWLER(Jesus College, Oxford): *Vergil, Aeneid 6.392-4 again*

LCM 8.5(May 1983), 77-78

T.E.Kinsey (LCM 7.10[Dec.1982], 155) makes some telling points against my interpretation of the *quamquam* clause in *Aeneid* 6.394: with some diffidence let me attempt a reply. The lines run:

*nec vero Alciden me sum laetatus euntem
accepisse lacu, nec Thesea Pirithoumque,
dis quamquam geniti atque invicti viribus essent.*

I had suggested that we have the subjunctive with *quamquam* because the concessive clause is dependent on *accepisse* rather than on *sum laetatus*; Charon accepted Hercules, Theseus and Pirithous on to his boat even though they were *invicti viribus*, and paid for it. Kinsey raises three objections:

- (a) 'If the *quamquam* clause contains reasons for not taking Hercules and the rest, it gives a statement of a very odd sort, since one would expect *nec ... sum laetatus* to refer to something normally productive of joy, or at least harmless.'. But *nec ... sum laetatus* is a strong litotes modelled on the Greek usages with χαίρω (as Conington noted) and Homeric lines like *Iliad* 1.330 οὐδ' ἄρα τῷ γε ἰδὼν γήθησεν Ἀχιλλεύς or *Odyssey* 12.87-8 οὐδέ κέ τις μιν ἰγνώσκειεν ἰδὼν, οὐδ' εἰ θεὸς ἀντιδῶσει; there is a bilingual pun on the name Χάρων (Norden on 384-416, p.237; cf. Achaeus fr.11 Sn., Aristophanes, *Ran.*184). 'I rued the day I accepted them on to my boat even though they were living men' is still odd, but that is because we naturally refer the concessive clause to the main verb; there is no linguistic marker in English to make us take it with 'accepted'. There is in Latin, the use of the subjunctive within the clause (which is why I cannot accept O.Skutsch's suggestion [LCM 7.6{Jun.1982}, 90] that Vergil would have used *quamvis* but for the jingle with *dis*). The subjunctive performs the same function in Lucretius 2.203-5:

*sic igitur flammae quoque debent posse per auras
aeris expressae sursum succedere, quamquam
pondera, quantum in se est, deorsum deducere pugnent.*

Here *pugnent* tells us to take the concessive clause with *posse* rather than with *debent*.

- (b) 'The facts given in the *quamquam* clause ... are not in themselves reasons for refusing' to take Hercules and the others on board, because a man might be *invictus viribus* but still be dead and a legitimate passenger - Achilles is Kinsey's example. The phrases of 394 do require more attention than I gave them. *dis geniti* comes, with the end of 393, from the interpolated line at *Odyssey* 11.631 ἠοσιὰ Πειρίθοῦν τε, θεῶν ἐρικυδέα τέκνα. In part *invicti viribus* corresponds to

- 78 ἐρικύδεα (or the variant ἀριδείκτα in Plutarch, *Thes.* 20), but it is obviously more than that. The phrase is not paralleled in Latin (*Thes.* VII.2 189.61), and the other ablatives found with *invictus* offer analogies for taking it either as 'unconquered by (other people's) strength' or 'unconquered in (their own) strength'. Perhaps both are felt, but with most commentators I take the second to be more likely, despite usages like ἔφι δαμῆναι, *vi vincere* (cf. A. Ernout, *Philologica II*, *Etudes et commentaires* 26 [Paris 1957], 122-3, Marx on Lucilius 613, and note *Aen.* 6 47-8).

There is an obvious allusion to the Roman cult of *Hercules Invictus* (cf. *Thes.* VII.2 187.20ff., M. Imhof, *Beiträge aus der Thesaurusarbeit*, *MH* 14 [1957], 191-215, and the standard works on Roman religion); the Greek equivalent is commonly καλλίνικος (cf. Bond on Euripides *HF* 48f.), but ἀνίκητος is found from the time of Tyrtaeus 11.1 W. ἀλλ', Ἡρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικῆτος γένος ἔστέ, | θάρσείτε (see Prato ad loc., and, for the epithet on inscriptions, O. Weinreich, *Θεοὶ ἐπὶ ἡρώων*, *MDAI(A)* 37 [1912], 1-68 at 24 n.1). It was sufficiently part of the recognized image of Hercules to figure in Stoic allegory of him (cf. Cornutus *Theol. Graec. Compend.* 31 - though there are textual problems there, for the solution to which we must await the promised edition of P. Krafft; Seneca, *de benef.* 4.8.1). Perhaps the most important passage unfortunately depends on a supplement, though a probable one, viz. Bacchylides 5.56-9:

δοῦναι π[ο]τ' ἐρεῖσι πύλων
ἀνδρ' ἀνίκητον λέγουσιν
ἔρνος Διὸς | ἀργικερά-
νου δώματα φερεσφόνας πανιαύρου

(where we also find an equivalent for *dis geniti*). With *viribus* we remember the common epic periphrasis βῆν Ἡρακλεῖν (*Lexicon des frühgriechischen Epos* s.v. βῆν I.4a, 10.64.3ff.), which is not always empty (cf. Russo on Hesiod *Sc.* 52); this is reduplicated at Hesiod *Theogony* 332, on Heracles' killing of the Nemean lion, ἀλλὰ ἔ | εἰς ἐδάμασσε βῆς Ἡρακλεῖος (cf. *Theog.* 951 εἰς Ἡρακλῆος).

Now, I would not deny that in all these uses of *invictus*, ἀνίκητος, βῆν, and εἰς, the main reference is to Hercules' labours; he is unconquered in all the tasks set him. But Hercules is not only unconquered by the monsters sent against him, he is also unconquered by death and old age. To live is to possess *vires*; as one grows older the *vires* depart (cf. e.g. *Aen.* 5.396 & 475), and when one dies one becomes quite insubstantial, like a *tenuem sine viribus umbram* (*Aen.* 10.636). The *locus classicus* is the description of Agamemnon in *Odyssey* 11.391-4:

κλαῖε δ' ὃ γε λιγέως, θαλερόν κατὰ δάμρουν εἴβων,
πιπνύς εἰς ἐμὲ χεῖρας, ὀρέσασθαι μενεαίων·
ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἔτ' ἦν εἰς ἔμπεδος οὐδέ τι κῆρυς,
οἷη περ πάρος ἔσκεν ἐνὶ γναμπτοῖσι μέλεσσι

(cf. R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* [Cambridge 1954], 187-199). A man who is dead could not happily be called *invictus viribus*; and that Hercules, Theseus and Pirithous were *invicti viribus* gives Charon a reason not to take them on to his boat, from which *corpora viva* are banned.

(c) 'Fowler's interpretation does not fit in with Charon's argument. Charon states the general reason against taking Aeneas (390-1) and then the reason for not making him an exception to the general rule (392-7). He had excellent reasons for making exceptions of Hercules and the others, but even so he got into trouble.' The problem with this view of the argument lies in 395-8. If we understand 394 as giving an excuse to Charon, then we must refer *nec ... sum laetatus* primarily to his subsequent punishment. 395-8, however, are most naturally taken as explaining *nec ... sum laetatus*; he transported them and got no joy of it - just look what they did! The punishment of Charon may be alluded to, but the primary reason for his discomfort lies in the very actions of Hercules, Theseus and Pirithous. Excuses are irrelevant to this.

We can of course deduce from 395-8 that these actions were so terrible that Charon must have been punished for them, but this requires a further logical leap in an already difficult passage. It would be a fool who would assert that Vergil, of all people, could not do this; but there is an easy and natural alternative if we take the concessive clause with *accepisse*. 392-7 are then not Charon's reasons for not making an exemption but three examples of the operation of the ban mentioned in 391. One might compare the précis of the passage given by H. Lloyd-Jones ('Heracles at Eleusis: P. Oxy. 2622 and P. S. I. 1391', *Maia* ns 19 [1967], 222), 'Charon accepts the living passengers with reluctance; it was against his will, he says, that he accepted earlier living passengers, Theseus and Pirithous, who came to abduct Persephone, and Heracles, who dragged Cerberus from the very throne of Hades to the upper world', except that *nec ... sum laetatus* I take to mean not that Charon was reluctant at the time but that he later came to regret it (hence the perfect infinitive *accepisse*).

As I say, I make this defence hesitantly and in the hope of provoking the *coup de grace* from T. E. Kinsey or anyone else. I am glad anyway that we are rid of the notion that the subjunctive means 'they said that they were' or 'I thought they were'; I still take the latter to have been Norden's view, pace O. Skutsch.

... τρόπον αἰγυπιῶν οἷτ' ἐκπατίοις
 ἀλγεσι παίδων ὑπατοὶ λεχέων 50
 στροφοδινοῦνται
 πτερύγων ἐρετμοῖσιν ἐρεσσόμενοι,
 δεινιοτήρη
 πόνον ὀρταλίχων ὀλέσαντες·
 ὑπατος δ' αἰὼν ἢ τις Ἀπόλλων 55
 ἢ Πάν ἢ Ζεὺς οἰωνόδροον
 γόνον ὀφρυβάων τῶνδε μετοίκων,
 ὑστερόποινον
 πέμπει παραβάσιν Ἐρινύν.

What is Apollo doing in the company of Pan and Zeus as one of the gods who may hearken to the lamentations of the bereft vultures and send an avenging Erinyes against those who have robbed the birds of their nestlings? The justification for the interest which the other two deities may take in the affair is readily enough sought: Pan is the protector of creatures of the wild (the sufferers within the simile); and Zeus is the avenger of wrongs done to the Atreidai (the vultures' analogues outside the simile). Apollo, however, seems to have little obvious connexion with either the literal or the metaphorical injured partners. Why, then, should he be mentioned so prominently, heading the list in front even of the much more readily suggested Pan or Zeus?

Why indeed should he be mentioned at all? The question has often been posed, but never answered with much plausibility. Fraenkel (*Commentary*, on 55f.) refers to most of the more prominent suggestions (Apollo as god of high places; god of augury; patron of birds; vultures common at Delphi; and the like), but concludes, with much justice, on an agnostic note. 'We cannot, as I see it, say with certainty what moved the poet to mention him ... It is probably better to admit that we do not know the poet's special motive in naming Apollo'. Yet there is one neglected aspect of Apollo's connexion with this passage, and with larger aspects of the *Oresteia*, which I tentatively suggest may go at least some way towards accounting for his presence here. This aspect concerns the (supposed) etymology of his name.

Riddling or punning etymologizing is a well-known proclivity of Aischylos' in the *Oresteia*: τίς ποτ' ὠνόμαζεν ἄδ' | ἐς τὸ πᾶν ἐτητύμως; (Ag. 681-2; see Fraenkel ad loc. and on 687). Thus we are offered 'Ἑλένα ἑλένας ἑλάνδρος ἐλέπτολις (Ag. 687ff.); and Δίκα Διδὸς κόρα (*Choe.* 949). The most prominent and powerful reference to Apollo in the *Agamemnon* is cast in this mould too, when Cassandra, recognizing the fate before her, cries (1080ff.):

Ἀπολλων, Ἀπολλων,
 ἀγυῖαι, ἀπόλλων ἐμός·
 ἀπώλεσας γὰρ οὐ μόνις τὸ δεύτερον.

She thus makes explicit the grim pun on Ἀπόλλων / (ἀπ-)όλλωμι with which play is made in numerous other passages in Greek literature¹.

Apollo, then, is the god whose name suggests destruction; might not the reverse process equally apply, whereby the note of destruction sounded by the use of (ἀπ-)όλλωμι might suggest the divinity whose name is Ἀπόλλων? The verbal proximity of ὀλέσαντες (54) and Ἀπόλλων (55) is close, and their connexion may be, if anything, reinforced by the curious fact (already noted) that Apollo's name, so far from being a mere afterthought, has apparently been attracted to the foremost position in the list of the three gods specified.

It must be admitted that ὀλέσαντες (54) is rather different in sense from ἀπόλλων / ἀπώλεσας at 1081f. (and indeed from the corresponding forms or cognates of (ἀπ-)όλλωμι in the examples quoted in note 1), the distinction being adequately drawn in the LSJ⁹ article on ὀλλωμι, AI and AII: ὀλέσαντες is in the secondary active sense of 'lose' not 'destroy'. But nevertheless this is not losing something by mislaying it, but by having it rendered void or destroyed (the parallel of the vultures with the Atreidai breaks down somewhat here - the Atreidai may hope to win Helen back, but 'the vultures know that they will not see their brood again', as Denniston-Page rightly point out in their commentary on 556-57, noting that γόνον is 'lament for the dead'). So it would still seem reasonable to detect in both of our examples (54 and 1081f.) a suggestion of the agony deriving

1. The most relevant of these are perhaps Archilochos (26 West)

ἔναξ Ἀπολλων, καὶ σὺ τοὺς μὲν αἰτίους
 πῆμαινε καὶ σφας ὄλλυ' ὥσπερ ὀλλύεις

and the fragment of Euripides' *Phaethon* (fr. 781 Nauck, 11-13) which runs

ὦ καλλιφεγγὲς Ἥλι', ὥς μ' ἀπώλεσας
 καὶ τόνδ'· Ἀπόλλων δ' ἐν βροτοῖς ὀρθῶς καλῇ,
 ὅστις τὰ σιγῶντ' ὀνόματ' οἶδε δαιμόνων

(see the excellent note in J. Diggle's commentary on the *Phaethon* [Cambridge 1970], line 225, for a clear exposition of the etymologizing thought behind these somewhat cryptic lines).

Plato's *Kratylos* (404e - 406a) also goes to some lengths to try to displace the idea that 'many fear Apollo's name ὥς σημαῖνον φοβᾶν τινα' by propounding no fewer than four, more benign, counter-etymologies.

We might also note Homer, *Iliad* 22.15, where Achilles complains

ἐβλαψαίς μ', ἐκάδρυγε, θεῶν ὀλοώτατε πάντων

(and what, indeed, of the *Iliad*'s very beginning, where (1.1-10) we hear the μῆνιν ὀλομένην of Achilles to have resulted from the strife stirred up by Ἀητοῦς καὶ Διδὸς υἱός, who also sent the plague whereby ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί?).

80 from destruction, either newly accomplished or imminent.

Apollo is, of course, powerfully prominent in the *Oresteia* in various contexts of destruction: he brings Cassandra to destruction; he instructs Orestes (several times, interestingly, described as a 'nestling' of Agamemnon's - *Choe.* 247ff., 256ff. & 501f.) to destroy Klytaimnestra or be himself destroyed (*Choe.* 247ff., *Eum.* 84); he hearkens to Orestes' cries and protects him from destruction at the hands of the Furies both by sanctuary at Delphi and testimony in the trial at Athens. It may be very much to the point that Apollo's name, with a hint at its connotations of destruction, and in a context of the god's capabilities for both succour and revenge, should be brought before the audience's minds at this early stage, particularly in a trilogy in which 'association or reminiscent repetition' (Anne Lebeck's phrase: *The Oresteia* [Cambridge, Mass., 1971], 1) of thematic elements plays such a large part.

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JOHN FERGUSON (Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham): *Aeschylus, Agamemnon 37-37* LCM 8.5(May 1983), 80

βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσῃ μέγας | βέβηκεν

There is an ancient view that βοῦς here means money; he has been bribed to keep his mouth shut (Pollux 9.61; Diogenianus 3.48; Hesychius s.v. βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσῃ; Schol.BD on Homer, *Iliad* 21.79; Zenobius 2.70). Fraenkel describes this as fatuous, which is unjust. It may not be right, but it is hardly fatuous.

Fraenkel treats it as a vivid popular phrase, and cites the standard parallels (Theognis 815; Sophocles, *OC* 1051ff.; Strattis fr.67); there is also a parody of it in Menander, *Hal.* fr.21 πᾶσι γὰρ οὗς ἐκεῖτ' ἐπὶ στόμα. Denniston and Page similarly dismiss it as 'a homely phrase'; did they borrow the words, perhaps unconsciously, from Sir Frank Fletcher's *Notes to the Agamemnon of Aeschylus*? This is not very different from the older view of Hermann, who thought it might have originated in an ox treading on its own litter, or on a man's foot, and wrote *multa proverbia tam fortunatam habent originem, eam ut, nisi casu servata est memoria, nemo possit eruere*, a verdict endorsed by Paley. Hesychius' alternative explanation ἦτοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ βόου would fit this. Sidgwick gives it a slight, and somewhat odd, twist: 'a pithy rustic metaphor for enforced silence; βοῦς being proverbially a *silent animal*'.

Wecklein, followed tentatively by Verrall, thought that the ox was a reference to a rawhide whip, a view which Fraenkel does not deign to mention. This accords with one of the scholiasts, who glosses it ἢ βόρος ἐπὶκείται ἢ φοβοῦμαι ζῆμιον ἐπικεισμένῃ μοι, and with the general statement of Hesychius that it might refer to a penalty against free speech, though he was thinking of a fine, in the context of the first interpretation of βοῦς.

In the *Palatine Anthology*, 7.446, appear words attributed to Pythagoras and said to have been written for the tomb of Zeus in Crete: ὧδε μέγας κεῖται ζῶν ὃν Δία κελήσκουσιν. In the margin a second hand has written ὧδε μέγας κεῖται βοῦς ὃν Δία κελήσκουσιν. A.B.Cook (*Zeus* II.345) has drawn attention to this, arguing that in Crete Zeus appeared in the form of a bull, as he did in bringing Europa to Crete, and as such was actually consumed by his votaries in the ritual sacrifice. The part played by the bull in Cretan ritual does not need arguing. Cook's suggestion was that the Watchman 'was, I take it, simply repeating a formula of the Cretan mysteries that had passed into a proverb for sworn secrecy'. Schneidewin suggested that the passage from Sophocles reflects a genuine formula of the Eleusinian Mysteries, and Ahrens (*Philologus* Supp.i [1860], 232) wondered if κλής might not have been a euphemistic substitute for βοῦς.

In *A Companion to Greek Tragedy* I took the monetary view as attested in antiquity. I have never found the 'rustic proverb' acceptable. The Sophocles passage does not remotely support it; Theognis and Strattis merely show that the phrase was familiar, which we know anyway. Wecklein's view is ingenious but lacks evidence to support it. I now think that Cook's view, which seems to have been totally neglected in literary discussions, has much to be said for it, and that the phrase may well come from the Cretan mysteries.

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R.G.M.NISBET (Corpus Christi College, Oxford): *iam mater simia* (*Juvenal 10.195*) LCM 8.5(May 1983), 80

et talis aspice rugas
quales, umbriferos ubi pandit Thabraca saltus,
in vetula scalpit iam mater simia bucca. 195

Juvenal is describing the wrinkles of age. Courtney comments on *iam* 'I do not know how to explain this word; it would most naturally go with *mater* and imply that apes do not bear young until late in life, but in spite of Robson, *CR* 22(1908), 245 this is zoologically false.' M.D.Reeve comments Courtney for his note (*CR* ns33[1983], 31), and the difficulty is a real one.

For *mater* I propose *marcens*, 'shrivelled'. This word is sometimes applied to old age; cf. Lucretius 3.946 *si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet*, Ovid *Met.* 7.314 *marcentia guttura* (of an elderly ram). In particular it may suggest wrinkles; cf. Pliny *NH* 15.52 *celerrime in rugas marcescunt pannucea* (of a kind of apple). So Persius says of an old woman *dum ne deterius sapiat pannucia Baucis* (4.21); *sapiat* confirms that he is comparing her to shrivelled apples.

If *marcens* is read, *iam* makes sense. The monkey, a *turpissima bestia* at the best of times, has now lost the bloom of youth.

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